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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 This is the second appeal of the district court’s order denying Mr. Brown’s motion 
to suppress statements made during two custodial interrogations with Florida police 
officers. In 2013, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order denying 
Mr. Brown’s motion and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether 
Mr. Brown’s statements were voluntary. Following a suppression hearing on remand, 
the district court ruled Mr. Brown’s statements were voluntary and thus denied his 
motion a second time. Mr. Brown now appeals to this Court, contending his statements 
were involuntary based on the totality of the circumstances, especially the implied 
threats of adverse consequences to his wife. 
  
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Much of the factual and procedural background is provided by the Court of 
Appeals’ Opinion in the first appeal of Mr. Brown’s case, State v. Brown, No. 38347, 155 
Idaho 423 (Ct. App. 2013). Mr. Brown had been “arrested in Florida on a fugitive 
warrant from Idaho” for theft of Les Breaw’s debit card. Id. at 426–27. Breaw was 
missing, and Idaho police officers found a body that they suspected was Breaw. Id. at 
427. Mr. Brown’s wife, Tyrah Brown (“Tyrah”), was also arrested in Florida. (Tr. Vol. I,1 
p.56, Ls.1–5.)  
                                            
1 There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the 
transcript of the September 5, 2014, and October 7, 2014, hearings on Mr. Brown’s 
motion to suppress. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the transcript of the status 
conference held on January 24, 2014. 
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Mr. Brown and Tyrah were separately interviewed by Florida police officers 
regarding the alleged grand theft and Breaw’s disappearance. Brown, 155 Idaho at 427. 
Tyrah was interviewed on March 21. (Tr. Vol. I, p.37, Ls.22–24.) Mr. Brown was 
interviewed twice—once on March 20 by Florida Detective John Long and an FBI agent 
and once on March 22 by only Detective Long. (See generally Tr., p.30, L.13–p.40, 
L.14.) In between the two interviews, on March 21, the body was identified as Breaw. 
Brown, 155 Idaho at 427.  
In these interviews, the Browns made a number of incriminating 
statements. When asked about Breaw’s $50,000 escrow check,2 Brown 
claimed that the money was owed to him because of services he had 
rendered Breaw, but eventually Tyrah confessed to forging Breaw’s name 
on the escrow check. Tyrah also confessed to shooting Breaw and hiding 
his body. According to Tyrah, she had done it because Breaw had raped 
her. When Brown was told that his wife had confessed, he also confessed 
to killing Breaw and told officers that Tyrah was not there. According to 
Brown, he and Breaw had gone shooting that day, and during the outing 
Breaw offered Brown the escrow check so that Brown would forgive 
Breaw for Breaw’s sexual misconduct with Tyrah. Breaw continued, 
however, to make disparaging remarks about Tyrah, which ultimately 
prompted Brown to shoot Breaw. Brown said that he buried Breaw in the 
snow and hid the murder weapon nearby. Brown even drew a map to the 
gun’s location to persuade officers that Tyrah was not involved. By the 
next day, however, Brown’s story had changed. He recanted his story 
about killing Breaw and instead told the Florida officers that shooting 
Breaw had been an accident. He claimed that Breaw had first shot Brown 
in the leg, which then caused Brown to accidentally shoot Breaw in the 
head. 
 
                                            
2 Prior to the interviews, law enforcement learned that “an escrow check for $50,000 
payable to Breaw had been deposited into a bank account held by Tyrah. Tyrah had 
opened the account on January 22, 2007, and deposited the check two days later. 
Within a week, all of the $50,000 had been withdrawn from the account.” Brown, 155 
Idaho at 427. 
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(R., pp.132–33 (quoting Brown, 155 Idaho at 427–28).) Mr. Brown was charged with 
first degree murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and grand theft. Brown, 155 Idaho 
at 428. (See also R., p.132.) 
Mr. Brown “filed a number of motions to suppress evidence, including his 
statements made to Florida police officers . . . . These motions were denied.” Brown, 
155 Idaho at 428. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Mr. Brown entered an 
Alford3 plea to voluntary manslaughter and accessory to grand theft, reserving his right 
to appeal “any prior adverse rulings by the district court.” Id. at 428. (See also 
R., p.132.) The district court sentenced Mr. Brown to fifteen years, with ten years fixed, 
for voluntary manslaughter and five years fixed for accessory to grand theft, to be 
served concurrently. Brown, 155 Idaho at 435.  
Mr. Brown appealed, primarily challenging the district court’s denial of his 
suppression motions. Id. at 428. The Court of Appeals affirmed on all issues, except 
Mr. Brown’s motion to suppress his statements made to the Florida police officers. Id. at 
426, 429–32, 437. (R., p.132.)  
With respect to Mr. Brown’s motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals provided: 
Brown next contends that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress incriminating statements to police. The motion 
asserted that his confession was involuntary because Brown was “of 
unsound mind” at the time of this interrogation by Florida police. On 
appeal, Brown contends that the prosecution did not satisfy its burden of 
showing that his statements were voluntary. 
 
. . . .  
 
In his motion to suppress, Brown asserted that his statements to 
Florida police were involuntary “because he was of unsound mind when 
                                            
3 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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the statements were made, and he was not competent to make a 
statement.”. . . . 
 
At the hearing, Brown did not allege that his statements were 
obtained because of police coercion. Instead, he argued only that his 
statements were not voluntary because of mental infirmity. The State’s 
argument was also primarily focused on this issue. The district court 
approached the matter as it was presented by the parties, concluding that 
any statements that Brown made to law enforcement agencies were not 
rendered involuntary based upon any claim of a mental health deficiency. 
On appeal, Brown does not continue to advance his argument 
below that the “evidence” he presented shows he was mentally incapable 
of voluntarily confessing. Rather, Brown now argues that his suppression 
motion should have been granted because the State presented no 
evidence whatsoever to meet its burden of proving that his statements 
were voluntary. 
Brown is correct in asserting that it was the State that bore both the 
burden of going forward with evidence and the burden of persuasion on 
Brown’s suppression motion. . . . The State presented no evidence about 
the circumstances of the interrogations or Brown's mental acuity at the 
time. On the other hand, Brown did not even allege that he made his 
statements because of coercive police activity, which is a necessary 
predicate to a finding that a confession is not “voluntary” within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor 
did he offer any evidence that the mental condition for which he was 
evaluated in Idaho in August of 2008 had any bearing upon the 
voluntariness of his statements made in Florida nearly a year and one-half 
earlier. However, determining that Brown presented little or no evidence of 
involuntariness does not mean that the State met its affirmative burden to 
prove voluntariness. In short, the record is devoid of adequate evidence 
from which the trial court could make any finding concerning the 
voluntariness or involuntariness of Brown's statements to Florida police. 
 
Brown, 155 Idaho at 429–31. Due to the State’s failure to meet its burden, the Court of 
Appeals was “constrained to vacate the order denying Brown’s suppression motion and 
remand for a new hearing at which, presumably, the State will present some relevant 
evidence bearing upon the voluntariness or involuntariness of Brown's statements to 
Florida officers.” Id. at 431–32. 
The district court held the new suppression hearing on remand. (See generally 
Tr. Vol. I, p.16, L.1–p.80, L.8.) Detective Long testified via two-way video conferencing. 
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(Tr., p.17, L.9–p.57, L.19.) Mr. Brown and licensed psychologist Carl Haugen, Ph.D., 
testified as well. (Tr., p.59, L.11–p.77, L.12.) Video recordings of the interrogation of 
Mr. Brown on March 20 and 22 and of Tyrah on March 20 were admitted into evidence. 
(Tr., p.30, L.12–p.32, L.6; State’s Ex. 1 (March 20, Mr. Brown); State’s Ex. 2 (March 22, 
Mr. Brown); Def.’s Ex. A (March 20, Tyrah).) Mr. Brown and the State submitted post-
hearing briefs. (R., pp.108–22.)  
The district court issued an Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Suppress. 
(R., pp.131–36.) The district court first found: 
In this case Miranda warnings were given, and Brown was not deprived of 
food or sleep. The interrogation by [Detective] Long was thorough, but it 
was not unduly long. Long’s approach was low key and made without 
threats. Brown appears to be of average intelligence and according to 
statements made to the police has operated a successful paralegal 
business. Dr. Haugen4 testified that at the time of his examination in 2008, 
Mr. Brown was of average intelligence, suffered from depression, 
amphetamine dependency, had an anti-social personality, was 
manipulative, was protective of others to get power and control, and 
significantly, for purposes of this motion, was resistant to being 
manipulated by others. These circumstances weigh in favor of the 
voluntariness of the statements.  
 
(R., p.134 (footnote omitted).) The district court then turned to Mr. Brown’s primary 
argument, that Detective Long coerced him to confess through the threats of adverse 
consequences to Tyrah. (R., p.134.) On this point, the district court reasoned: “Tyrah 
had already confessed to killing [Breaw]. The threat, express or implied, that she would 
be arrested was legitimate and was in good faith. She was arrested and prosecuted. 
Even if Brown’s confession was motivated by a desire to protect his wife, the confession 
                                            
4 In the original case, Dr. Haugen evaluated Mr. Brown and concluded that he was not 
competent to stand trial. (Tr., p.72, Ls.16–21, p.75, Ls.13–15.) After receiving 
Dr. Haugen’s evaluation, the district court committed Mr. Brown for ninety days to a 
secured medical facility for mental health treatment. Brown, 155 Idaho at 430. 
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was not involuntary.” (R., p.135.) Thus, the district court determined that the State met 
its burden to establish that Mr. Brown’s statements were voluntary. (R., p.135.) The 
district court affirmed the sentence previously imposed. (R., p.136.) Mr. Brown filed a 
timely notice of appeal from the district court’s Opinion and Order. (R., pp.145–47.)  
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown’s motion to suppress? 
 8 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Brown’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 After his arrest, Mr. Brown was interrogated twice by Detective Long regarding 
his and his wife’s involvement with Breaw. Mr. Brown confessed to killing Breaw for 
raping his wife in the second interrogation. Mr. Brown asserts that his confession was 
the product of psychological coercion by Detective Long, who manipulated Mr. Brown’s 
immense concern for his wife and any adverse consequences to her due to her 
confession to the same crime. Because Mr. Brown’s confession was coerced and thus 
involuntary, Mr. Brown contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress his statements. 
  
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a 
motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. 
Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). “The Court accepts the trial court’s 
findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 
(2005). “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the 
trial court.” Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570. The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.  
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C. Mr. Brown’s Statements Were Involuntary Under The Totality Of The 
Circumstances, Especially The Implied Threats Of Adverse Consequences To 
His Wife  
 
“It is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the 
State to use against a criminal defendant a statement that the defendant made 
involuntarily.” State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 516 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Miller v. 
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1985); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514–15 
(1963); State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709, 712 (Ct. App. 1998)). “The doctrine disallowing the 
use of involuntary confessions . . . applies to any confession that was the product of 
police coercion, either physical or psychological, or that was otherwise obtained by 
methods offensive to due process.” State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 814–15 (Ct. App. 
1997) (citing Miller, 474 U.S. 104 (1985); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985); 
Haynes, 373 U.S. at 514–15).  
To determine whether a statement was involuntary, “the inquiry is whether the 
defendant’s will was overborne by police coercion.” Schumacher, 136 Idaho at 516. 
“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 
‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). “Although the ultimate 
issue of voluntariness of a confession sought to be suppressed is a legal question, the 
trial court’s underlying factual findings as to whether the police intimidated, threatened 
or coerced the suspect to make a statement are measured by a totality of the 
circumstances test.” State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888, 891–92 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations 
omitted). In short, “the proper inquiry is to look to the totality of the circumstances and 
then ask whether the defendant’s will was overborne.” State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214 
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(1993) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)). If the defendant’s will 
was overborne, “the confession cannot be deemed ‘the product of a rational intellect 
and a free will.’” Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (quoting Blackburn v. 
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960)). 
“It is true that threats to prosecute a defendant’s loved one when there is no 
legitimate basis to do so may be coercive and can render a confession involuntary.” 
Schumacher, 136 Idaho at 517. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
psychological coercion brought on by a police officer’s threat of adverse consequences 
to a loved one. In Lynumn, for example, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
defendant’s confession was “not voluntary, but coerced,” when “the police had told her 
that state financial aid for her infant children would be cut off, and her children taken 
from her, if she did not ‘cooperate.’” 372 U.S. at 534. Likewise, in Spano v. New York, 
360 U.S. 315 (1959), the United States Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s “will 
was overborne” based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 321–23. Of particular 
significance was law enforcement’s instruction to a police trainee, who was also the 
petitioner’s childhood friend, “falsely to state that petitioner’s telephone call had gotten 
him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be 
disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child.” Id. at 317, 323. See 
United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335–37 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding psychological 
coercion produced defendant’s confession after police caused the defendant to fear, if 
she failed to cooperate, that she would not see her young child for a long time); see also 
United States v. Finch, 998 F.2d 349, 355–56 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding the defendant’s 
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statements involuntary due the police’s unfounded threats to arrest the defendant’s 
mother and female companion). 
In State v. Davis, 115 Idaho 462 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals came to 
similar conclusion of psychological coercion due to threats of adverse consequences to 
a loved one. Id. at 463–66. In that case, the prosecutor informed the defendant that his 
mother had been charged and arrested for the same crime due to his refusal to confess 
during the initial interview. Id. at 464. The prosecutor told the defendant that “it was 
‘time to talk’” and he believed the defendant had not yet confessed in order to protect 
his mother. Id. The defendant then confessed to the crime, “but only after an emotional 
display in which he pleaded leniency for this mother.” Id. After the defendant confessed, 
his mother was released on her own recognizance and her charges were dismissed 
during the preliminary hearing for insufficient evidence. Id. Based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the Court of Appeals held that “the timing and sequence of events 
surrounding [the mother’s] incarceration exerted a psychological influence on Davis 
sufficient to impede his ability to render a voluntary confession.” Id.  
 Similar to Davis, Detective Long’s interrogation tactics with Mr. Brown “exerted a 
psychological influence” on him “sufficient to impede his ability to render a voluntary 
confession.” Id. Mr. Brown and Tyrah were arrested together on March 20, and they 
were placed in separate holding cells. (Tr., p.44, L.16–p.46, L.11, p.56, Ls.1–5, p.56, 
Ls.14–25, p.64, Ls.4–8.) Mr. Brown was first interrogated the afternoon of March 20. 
(Tr., p.46, Ls.12–15.) During the first interrogation, Mr. Brown told Detective Long that 
Tyrah had five miscarriages since she and Mr. Brown were married. (State’s Ex. 1, 
12:20–12:33.) Mr. Brown explained to Detective Long that, most recently, Tyrah found 
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out she was pregnant in late December, but she had another miscarriage in early 
March. (State’s Ex. 1, 16:37–17:03.) Throughout the interrogation, Mr. Brown expressed 
concern for his wife and a focus on her health and well-being, noting her past struggles 
with drug abuse and suicide attempts. (State’s Ex. 1, 18:55–19:59, 24:43–25:00, 31:20–
32:18, 35:13–35:40, 53:00–54:10). The first interview lasted about one hour and forty 
minutes. (Tr., p.32, Ls.10–17; see generally State’s Ex. 1.)  
 On March 21, Detective Long interrogated Tyrah. (Tr., p.49, Ls.1–10.) Tyrah told 
Detective Long that she killed Breaw after he raped her. (Tr., p.49, L.20–p.51, L.3.) She 
also told Detective Long that she had fought off Breaw’s sexual advances in the past. 
(Tr., p.49, L.24–p.50, L.2.) She said that she was by herself when she shot him. 
(Tr., p.52, Ls.2–4.) She explained to Detective Long that she hid the body and threw the 
gun in a dumpster. (Tr., p.51, Ls.4–6, p.51, L.19–p.52, L.1, p.52, Ls.5–11.) Tyrah also 
agreed to and took a polygraph. (Tr., p.52, Ls.12–23.) At the suppression hearing, 
however, Detective Long testified that he “wasn’t believing her story” because she could 
not tell him the exact location of where she dumped the gun. (Tr., p.53, Ls.15–25.) She 
provided him only a vague description. (Tr., p.52, Ls.8–10, p.53, Ls.22–23.)    
On March 22, Detective Long interrogated Mr. Brown a second time. Detective 
Long wanted Mr. Brown to tell him “what he knew about it” because he was not 
“convinced” Tyrah killed Breaw. (Tr., p.53, Ls.15–19.) Throughout the interrogation, 
Detective Long manipulated Mr. Brown’s relationship with his wife. Detective Long told 
Mr. Brown early on in the interview that Tyrah had told him “everything” about “the 
money, the murder, the rape, and that he was involved.” (Tr., p.38, L.25–p.39, L.1, p.54, 
Ls.17–19; State’s Ex. 2, 4:10–6:20.) Detective Long told Mr. Brown that he knew 
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Mr. Brown found out Breaw had “forced himself” on his wife. (State’s Ex. 2, 5:05–5:10.) 
Detective Long justified Mr. Brown’s actions as simply protecting his wife, not as a 
“serial killer” or “spree killer.” (State’s Ex. 2, 5:08–5:28.) Detective Long continued with 
this narrative, telling Mr. Brown over and over again that his wife was raped and 
Mr. Brown acted justifiably by defending her and doing his “husband” duty. (State’s Ex. 
2, 5:22–7:27, 13:55–14:00, 14:17–14:39, 17:02–17:08, 23:14–24:00, 26:02–26:09.) 
Detective Long highlighted how Tyrah had been abused her whole life and Mr. Brown 
was the “only person” that stood up for her. (State’s Ex. 2, 11:52–12:12, 13:26–13:40, 
17:02–17:16.) He emphasized how much Tyrah loved Mr. Brown for “always taking care 
of her.” (State’s Ex. 2, 5:42–5:53, 13:55–14:00, 20:13–20:50, 42:02–42:08.) Detective 
Long asked multiple times Mr. Brown to “set the record straight,” “save himself,” and 
“help me help you” because this was a crime of “rage, revenge, anger, heat of passion” 
to defend his wife. (State’s Ex. 2, 7:05–7:25, 7:48–8:15, 10:35–11:27, 26:15–26:40.) 
Eventually, Mr. Brown provided an emotional confession to the crime, explaining how he 
shot Breaw after Breaw bragged to him about raping his wife and tried to buy him off. 
(State’s Ex. 2, 34:24–36:00, 39:52–41:36, 48:42–49:44, 51:58–53:40.)  
After the confession, Detective Long asked Mr. Brown for more details on how 
Tyrah was raped. (State’s Ex. 2, 59:02–59:12.) Mr. Brown told Detective Long that 
Tyrah “miscarried because of him.” (State’s Ex. 2, 1:22:44–1:22:57.) Mr. Brown also told 
Detective Long that he hoped Tyrah would be okay, Tyrah “didn’t do nothing,” and he 
wanted Tyrah to talk to a lawyer because she “had a life ahead of her.” (State’s Ex. 2, 
1:24:30–1:24:48, 1:30:20–1:30:40.) This interrogation lasted approximately one hour 
and thirty minutes. (See generally State’s Ex. 2.) Mr. Brown submits that the totality of 
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the circumstances demonstrate Detective Long took advantage of Mr. Brown’s 
vulnerable mental state and his desire to protect his wife after her rape, miscarriage, 
and possible criminal charges to obtain his confession. 
The facts of the interrogations here are distinguishable from the facts in 
Schumacher, which the district court relied on to determine that Mr. Brown’s confession 
was voluntary. (R., pp.134–35.) In Schumacher, the Court of Appeals cautioned that “a 
suspect’s confession is not involuntary merely because it was motivated by the desire to 
prevent a good faith arrest of a loved one.” 136 Idaho at 517. The Court of Appeals held 
that the defendant’s confession was voluntary because the agent’s threat to arrest the 
defendant’s wife “was not unjustified” due to the possibility of uncovering physical 
evidence linking the wife to the crime. Id. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 
agent did not suggest that the defendant “could prevent his wife’s arrest by confessing, 
so the agent’s comment did not pressure Schumacher to make a statement.” Id. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the agent’s inquiry into the care of the 
defendant’s children was “a legitimate point of inquiry” and any risk of adverse 
consequences to the children was created by the defendant’s illegal actions. Id.  
In contrast to Schumacher, Mr. Brown asserts that Detective Long’s implied 
threats of prosecution or harm to Tyrah were unjustified. At the time of the 
interrogations, Detective Long did not believe Tyrah’s confession. He testified to as 
much as the suppression hearing. (Tr., p.53, Ls.15–25.) Thus, Detective Long’s implied 
threats of consequences to Tyrah were unfounded and unsupported at the time. Rather, 
Detective Long used Tyrah’s false confession to coerce Mr. Brown to confess to the 
same crime. Considering that Detective Long’s interrogation tactics elicited what he 
 15 
believed to be a false confession from Tyrah, there is no reason to believe that these 
same tactics would not work on Mr. Brown to obtain an involuntary confession. 
Mr. Brown submits that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. 
  
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s opinion 
and order denying his motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 3rd day of February, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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